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STOCK PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY 
CEPS Working Document No. 304/September 2008 
PAUL DE GRAUWE
∗ 
1. Introduction 
The question of whether central banks should react to stock price developments has been hotly 
debated. It is fair to state that there are two schools of thought on this issue. The first one, which 
is well represented by Bernanke & Gertler (2001), Schwartz (2002), and Greenspan (2007), 
argues that central banks should not use the interest rate to influence stock prices. The main 
arguments advanced by this school of thought are, first, that it is difficult to identify bubbles ex 
ante, (and it only makes sense to intervene if stock prices are on a bubble path, i.e. if they 
clearly deviate from underlying fundamentals).
1 The second argument is that even if a bubble 
can be identified ex ante, using the interest rate is ineffective to burst a bubble. All the central 
bank can do is to limit the damage once the bubble bursts. This school of thought also stresses 
that by keeping the rate of inflation low, the central bank contributes to creating an environment 
of sustainable growth in which bubbles are less likely to emerge.  
The second school of thought takes the opposite view (see Smets, 1997, Ceccetti et al., 2002, 
Borio & White, 2004, Bordo & Jeanne, 2002 and Roubini, 2006). Stock prices are often subject 
to bubbles and crashes. These can have strong pro-cyclical effects and can also affect the 
stability of financial markets. Since central banks are responsible for financial stability they 
should monitor asset prices and try to prevent the emergence of bubbles (that invariably lead to 
crashes). In this view the use of the interest rate is seen as effective in preventing bubbles from 
emerging.
2 Few economists from this school will argue that the central bank should target a 
particular value of the stock price (in the same way as it targets an inflation rate). Instead many 
will argue that a strategy of ‘leaning against the wind’ may be useful to reduce too strong 
movements in stock prices.  
In this paper we analyze the question of whether central banks should try to influence stock 
prices using their interest rate policy. We will do this in the context of a behavioural 
macroeconomic model as developed in De Grauwe (2008). (For similar models see Branch & 
Evans (2006) and Brazier, et al. (2006)). Thus we depart from rational expectations and their 
implementation in the currently fashionable DSGE-models. The reason why we depart from this 
modelling approach is double. First, DSGE-models make extremely strong informational 
assumptions, i.e. agents are assumed to understand the structure of the underlying model. This 
follows directly from the rational expectations assumption which requires agents to use the 
underlying model structure to make forecasts. The scientific evidence from other sciences 
                                                      
∗ The author is Professor of Economics at the University of Leuven and Associate Senior Fellow at CEPS. 
A shorter version of this paper is being published simultaneously in the CEPS Policy Brief series (No. 
171). 
1 An extreme version of this school of thought denies the existence of bubbles altogether. In this view 
financial markets are efficient and thus stock prices always reflect the best available information. Since 
central banks do not posses better information than markets, it makes no sense for them to try to influence 
stock prices.  
2 Note that both schools of thought accept that the central bank has other instruments to maintain financial 
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(psychology, brain sciences) casts doubts about the plausibility of this assumption.  It is no 
exaggeration to say that there is now strong evidence that individual agents suffer from deep 
cognitive problems limiting their capacity to understand and to process the complexity of the 
information they receive. Many anomalies that challenge the rational expectations assumption 
were discovered (see Thaler, 1994, for spirited discussions of these anomalies; see also Camerer 
& Lovallo, 1999, Read & van Leeuwen, 1998, and Della Vigna, 2007).  
The second reason why we depart from DSGE-modelling is that in these models there is no 
room for bubbles and crashes. Markets are always efficient, so that asset prices reflect 
underlying fundamentals. Thus central banks cannot improve welfare by guiding asset prices to 
other values than those produced by efficient markets. In a way it can be said that DSGE-
models are not the appropriate tools to study the issue of whether central banks should try to 
prick asset bubbles, as such bubbles cannot occur in these models.   
In our modelling approach we will take the view that agents face cognitive problems in 
understanding and processing information. As a result, they use simple rules (‘heuristics’) to 
guide their behaviour (see Gabaix et al., 2006). They do this not because they are irrational, but 
rather because the complexity of the world is overwhelming. In a way it can be said that using 
heuristics is a rational response of agents who are aware of their limited capacity to understand 
the world. The challenge when we try to model heuristics will be to introduce discipline in the 
selection of rules so as to avoid that ‘everything becomes possible’.  
In this paper we develop a parsimonious model capable of generating endogenous and self-
fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism leading to bubbles and crashes in asset markets. We 
look for parsimony because we wish to find out what is the simplest possible model needed to 
generate such cycles.    
2.  A behavioural macroeconomic model 
In this section we describe our modelling strategy. We do this by presenting a standard 
aggregate-demand-aggregate supply model augmented with a Taylor rule. The model has two 
novel features. The first on is that agents use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the future. 
These rules are subjected to a selection mechanism. Put differently, agents will endogenously 
select the forecasting rules that have delivered the highest fitness in the past. This selection 
mechanism acts as a disciplining device on the kind of rules that are acceptable. Since agents 
use different heuristics we also obtain heterogeneity.  
The second novelty is to introduce asset prices (stock prices) in this behavioural model. Our 
purpose is to analyze how a departure from rational expectations affects our view of the need for 
monetary authorities to intervene in the stock markets. In the standard rational expectations 
models (including the DSGE-model), there is no need for them to monitor asset prices and to 
attempt to influence these prices because fully informed agents in these models ensure that 
bubbles and crashes in asset prices do not occur. Put differently, in these models financial 
markets are efficient and asset prices are uniquely determined by underlying fundamentals. It 
would be quite counterproductive for the monetary authorities to try to influence these asset 
prices.
3  
                                                      
3 There is a strand of literature using rational expectations models that allow for bubbles and crashes in 
the asset prices. Bubbles and crashes arise as a result of multiple equilibria (sunspot equilibria) that are 
embedded in rational expectations models. Examples are Azariadis (1981), Benhabib & Farmer (1996) 
and Farmer (2006). The conventional DSGE-models however exclude this possibility by ruling out 
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2.1  The basic model 
We first present the model without asset prices. It consists of an aggregate demand equation, an 
aggregate supply equation and a Taylor rule.  
The aggregate demand equation can be derived from dynamic utility maximisation. This 
produces an Euler equation in the same vain as in DSGE-models (see Gali, 2008). We obtain  
 
t t t t t t t t E r a y a y E a y ε π + − + − + = + − + )
~
( ) 1 (
~
1 2 1 1 1 1    (1) 
 
where yt is the output gap in period t, rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the rate of inflation, and 
εt is a white noise disturbance term.   t E
~
 is the expectations operator where the tilde above E 
refers to expectations that are not formed rationally. We will specify this process subsequently.  
We follow the procedure introduced in DSGE-models of adding a lagged output in the demand 
equation. This is usually justified by invoking habit formation.   
The aggregate supply equation can be derived from profit maximisation of individual producers. 
We assume as in DSGE-models a Calvo pricing rule, which leads to a lagged inflation variable 
in the equation.
4 The supply curve can also be interpreted as a New Keynesian Philips curve.  
We obtain:  
t t t t t t y b b E b η π π π + + − + = − + 2 1 1 1 1 ) 1 (
~
   (2) 
 
Finally the Taylor rule describes the behaviour of the central bank 
 
t t t t t t u r c y c c r + + + − = −1 3 2
*
1 ) ( π π      (3) 
 
where 
*
t π  is the inflation target which for the sake of convenience will be set equal to 0. Note 
that we assume, as is commonly done, that the central bank smoothes the interest rate. This 
smoothing behaviour is represented by the lagged interest rate in equation (3). Ideally, the 
Taylor rule should be formulated using a forward looking inflation variable, i.e. central banks 
set the interest rate on the basis of their forecasts about the rate of inflation. We have not done 
so here in order to maintain simplicity in the model.   
2.2  Introducing asset prices 
Next we describe how asset prices enter the model. These asset prices will be assumed to be 
stock prices. We allow the stock prices to affect aggregate demand and supply. The way we do 
this is by allowing changes in stock prices to affect the cost of credit of firms. An increase in the 
                                                      
4 It is now standard in DSGE-models to use a pricing equation in which marginal costs enter on the right 
hand side. Such an equation is derived from profit maximisation in a world of imperfect competition. It 
allows introducing more detail into the model and makes it possible to specify productivity shocks better. 
It also allows for analysing how shocks in markups affect the economy. We have not tried to introduce 
this feature here (see Gali, 2008 and Smets & Wouters, 2003).  4 | PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
stock price of the firm increases its net equity. As a result, credit becomes more easily available 
for the firm, stimulating investment demand. This is the aggregate demand effect of an increase 
in the stock price. It is akin to the credit multiplier analysis made popular by Bernanke & 
Gertler (1995). The same increase in the firm’s equity also reduces its credit costs on its 
outstanding debt. This lowers the marginal costs of the firm. This is the supply side effect.  
These demand and supply side effects can also be labelled balance sheet effects of stock price 
changes. An increase in stock prices improves the balance sheet of the firm allowing it to 
increase its spending for investment at a lower cost and to run its operations at a lower (credit) 
cost. As it is a balance sheet effect we will introduce a lag in its operation, i.e. an increase in the 
stock price in period t improves the published balance sheet at the end of period t, allowing the 
firm to profit from the improved balance sheet in the next period.  
Clearly, a decline in the stock price has the reverse effect on the balance sheets of firms, leading 
to a negative effect on investment spending and on the credit costs.  
We use the discounted dividend model (Gordon model) to compute stock prices, i.e.  
t
t t
t R
D E
S
) ( 1 + =         ( 4 )  
where  Et(Dt+1) is the expected future dividend, which is assumed to be constant from t+1 
onwards;  Rt is the discount rate used to compute the present value of future dividends. It 
consists of the interest rate rt and the equity premium (which we will assume to be constant). 
Thus we assume that each period agents make a forecast of the future dividends that they 
assume will then be constant for the indefinite future. They re-evaluate this forecast every 
period.  
Dividends are a fraction, α,  of nominal GDP. Thus the forecasts of future dividends are tightly 
linked to the forecasts of output and inflation that we discuss in the next section.   
We now specify the aggregate demand curve as follows 
t t t t t t t t t s a E r a y a y E a y ε π + Δ + − + − + = − + − + 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 )
~
( ) 1 (
~
   (5) 
where Δst-1 is the change in the log of St-1  and a3  ≥ 0.  
The aggregate supply (New Keynesian Phillips curve) is specified as follows 
t t t t t t t s b y b b E b η π π π + Δ + + − + = − − + 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 ) 1 (
~
    (6) 
where b3 ≤ 0, i.e. an increase in the stock prices lowers marginal costs and thus has a negative 
effect on inflation.  
Finally we will allow the central bank to react to changes in the stock prices. Thus the Taylor 
rule becomes 
t t t t t t t u s c r c y c c r + Δ + + + − = − − 1 4 1 3 2
*
1 ) ( π π      (7) 
Note that we specify the way the central bank reacts to stock prices in a different way than the 
way it reacts to inflation and output. In the latter case, the central bank has a target for inflation 
and output and wishes to reduce deviations from that target.
5 In the case of stock prices, the 
                                                      
5 This may not be obvious for the output gap. The output gap is the difference between observed output 
and  capacity (natural) output. Thus implicit in the Taylor rule is the idea that the central banks wants to 
minimise the deviation of observed output from capacity output (the target).  STOCK PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY | 5 
 
central bank has no target for stock prices. Instead, it follows a ‘leaning against the wind’ 
strategy. This is the way proponents of central banks’ involvement in the stock market usually 
formulate the central bank’s strategy. 
2.3  Expectations formation: forecasting output 
We take the view that agents experience cognitive problems in understanding how the world 
functions. Thus, in contrast to what is assumed in rational expectations models in which agents 
understand the full model structure and the objective distribution of the shocks, we assume that 
agents use simple rules (heuristics) to forecast future output. The way we proceed is as follows. 
We start with a very simple heuristics for forecasting and apply it to the forecasting rules of 
future output. We assume that because agents do not fully understand how the output gap is 
determined, their forecasts are biased. We assume that some agents are optimistic and 
systematically bias the output gap upwards, others are pessimistic and systematically bias the 
output gap downwards.  
 
The optimists are defined by   g y E t
opt
t = +1
~
      ( 8 )  
 
The pessimists are defined by  g y E t
pes
t − = +1
~
      ( 9 )  
where g > 0 expresses the degree of bias in estimating the output gap. We will interpret 2g to 
express the divergence in beliefs among agents about the output gap.  
Note that we do not consider this assumption of a simple bias to be a realistic representation of 
the how agents forecast. Rather is it a very parsimonious representation of a world where agents 
do not know the ‘truth’ (i.e. the underlying model) and have a biased view about this truth.  
The market forecast is obtained as a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
 
pes
t t pes t
opt
t t opt t t E y E y E
~ ~ ~
, 1 , 1 α α + = + +    (10) 
 
g g y E t pes t opt t t , , 1
~
α α − = +      ( 1 1 )  
 
and   1 , , = + t pes t opt α α      ( 1 2 )  
 
where   t opt, α  and   t pes, α   are the weights of optimists, receptively, pessimists in the market. 
A methodological issue arises here. The forecasting rules (heuristics) introduced here are not 
derived at the micro level and then aggregated. Instead, they are imposed ex post, once the 
demand and supply equations are derived. This has also been the approach in the learning 
literature pioneered by Evans & Honkapohja (2001). Ideally one would like to derive the 
heuristics from the micro-level in an environment in which agents experience cognitive 6 | PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
problems. Our knowledge about how to model this behaviour at the micro level
6 and how to 
aggregate it is too sketchy, however, and we have not tried to do so.  
As indicated earlier, agents are rational in the sense that they continuously evaluate their 
forecast performance. We follow Brock & Hommes (1997) in specifying the procedure agents 
follow in this evaluation process. Recently, Branch & Evans (2006) introduced this selection 
mechanism in a macroeconomic model.  
Agents compute the forecast performance of the different heuristics as follows: 
 
[]
2
1 ,
1
,
~
k t k t opt k t
k
k t opt y E y U − − − −
∞
=
− − = ∑ω     (13) 
[]
2
1 ,
1
,
~
k t k t pes k t
k
k t pes y E y U − − − −
∞
=
− − = ∑ω     (14) 
 
where U opt,t  and  Upes,t  are the forecast performances of the optimists and pessimists, 
respectively. These are defined as the mean squared forecasting errors (MSFEs) of the 
optimistic and pessimistic forecasting rules; ωk are geometrically declining weights.  
The proportion of agents using the optimistic and the pessimistic forecasting rules is then 
determined in the following way (Brock & Hommes, 1997).
7  
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Equation (15) says that as the past forecast performance of the optimists improves relative to 
that of the pessimists more agents will select the optimistic belief about the output gap for their 
future forecasts. As a result the proportion of agents using the optimistic rule increases. 
Equation (16) has a similar interpretation. The parameter γ measures the ‘intensity of choice’, 
i.e. the intensity with which agents allow their choice for a particular heuristic to depend on past 
forecast performance. In the limit when γ = ∞ only one, the best performing heuristic, will be 
selected. 
Note that this selection mechanism is the disciplining device introduced in this model on the 
kind of rules of behaviour that are acceptable. Only those rules that pass the fitness test remain 
in place. The others are weeded out. In contrast with the disciplining device implicit in rational 
                                                      
6 Psychologists and brain scientists struggle to understand how our brain processes information. There is 
as yet no generally accepted model we could use to model the micro-foundations of information 
processing. 
7 Such a specification is often used in discrete choice theory. See Anderson et al., (1992). STOCK PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY | 7 
 
expectations models which implies that agents have superior cognitive capacities, we do not 
have to make such an assumption here.  
It is also useful to point out that the selection mechanism used here can be interpreted as an 
evolutionary mechanism that allows high forecasting performance to spread throughout the 
economy through replication.   
2.4 Expectations  formation: forecasting inflation 
Agents also make forecasts of inflation in this model. We specify the inflation expectations 
formation in an environment in which the central bank has announced an inflation target, which 
agents may or may not find credible.  
We follow Brazier et al. (2006) in allowing for two inflation forecasting rules. One rule is based 
on the announced inflation target; the other rule extrapolates inflation from the past into the 
future. This is a different pair of heuristics than in the case of output forecasting. The difference 
between inflation forecasting and output forecasting is that in the former case there is a central 
bank that announces a particular inflation target. This target works as an anchor for the forecasts 
of agents. Such an anchor is absent in the case of output forecasting.  
The ‘inflation targeters’ use the central bank’s inflation target to forecast future inflation, i.e.  
* ~
t
tar
t E π =           ( 1 7 )  
where for the sake of convenience we set the inflation target 
*
t π  = 0 
 
The ‘extrapolators’ are defined by   1 − = t
ext
t E π      ( 1 8 )  
 
The market forecast is a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
 
1 , 1 , 1
~ ~ ~
+ + + + = t
ext
t t ext t
tar
t t tar t t E E E π β π β π      ( 1 9 )  
or 
 
1 ,
*
, 1 − + + = t t ext t t tar t t E π β π β π       ( 2 0 )  
 
and   1 , , = + t ext t tar β β        ( 2 1 )  
 
We use the same selection mechanism as in the previous section based on the mean squared 
forecasting errors produced by the two rules to determine the proportions of agents trusting the 
inflation target and those who do not trust it and revert to extrapolation of past inflation, i.e.  
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This inflation forecasting heuristics can be interpreted as a procedure of agents to find out how 
credible the central bank’s inflation targeting is. If this is very credible, using the announced 
inflation target will produce good forecasts and as a result, the proportion of agents relying on 
the inflation target will be high. If on the other hand the inflation target does not produce good 
forecasts (compared to a simple extrapolation rule) it will not be used much and therefore the 
proportion of agents using it will be small.  
Finally, the stock price St is determined by the forecasts of future dividends. We assume these to 
be a constant fraction of GDP. Thus the change in the stock price Δst  is determined by the 
forecast of future inflation and output gap. We will use the same expectations formation process 
as the one spelled out in the previous paragraphs.  
2.5  Calibrating the model  
We proceed by calibrating the model. In appendix A we present the parameters used in the 
calibration exercise. We have calibrated the model in such a way that the time units can be 
considered to be months.  
We show the results of a simulation exercise in which the three shocks (demand shocks, supply 
shocks and interest rate shocks) are i.i.d. with standard deviations of 0.5%. In the first set of 
simulations we assume that the central bank does not attempt to influence the stock prices, i.e. 
c4 = 0. We will analyze the implications of allowing the central bank to react to changes in the 
stock price in section 3.   
We first present a simulation in the time domain. Figure 1 shows the time pattern of output, 
stock prices and inflation produced by the model. We observe a strong cyclical movement in the 
output gap. The source of these cyclical movements is seen to be the weight of optimists and 
pessimists in the market (see second panel of Figure 1). The model in fact generates endogenous 
waves of optimism and pessimism. During some periods pessimists dominate and this translates 
into below average output growth. These pessimistic periods are followed by optimistic ones 
when optimistic forecasts tend to dominate and the growth rate of output is above average. 
These waves of optimism and pessimism are essentially unpredictable. Other realisations of the 
shocks produce different cycles with the same general characteristics.  
The third panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of the stock prices in the time domain. The 
model creates periods of bullish and bearish behaviour of the stock prices that are associated 
with the same waves of optimism and pessimism (second panel). The model is also capable of 
creating what appears to be a bubble and a crash (around period 300). This feature is regularly 
found in the simulations of the stock prices in the time domain. 
These endogenously generated cycles in output and stock prices are made possible by a self-
fulfilling mechanism that can be described as follows. A series of random shocks creates the 
possibility that one of the two forecasting rules, say the optimistic one, delivers a higher payoff, 
i.e. a lower mean squared forecast error (MSFE). This attracts agents that were using the STOCK PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY | 9 
 
pessimistic rule. The ‘contagion-effect’ leads to an increasing use of the optimistic belief to 
forecast the output-gap, which in turn stimulates aggregate demand and leads to a bull stock 
market. Optimism is therefore self-fulfilling. A boom is created. At some point, negative 
stochastic shocks make a dent in the MSFE of the optimistic forecasts. The pessimistic belief 
becomes attractive and therefore fashionable again. The stock market and the economy turn 
around.   
The last panel of Figure 1 shows the simulated inflation. Inflation is kept within a relatively 
narrow band around the target (0%) most of the time. Occasionally, it goes beyond this band. 
This feature is found repeatedly in different simulations of the model. It has to do with the fact 
that occasionally the extrapolators in forecasting inflation tend to dominate the market. As a 
result, the credibility of inflation targeting is reduced allowing the inflation rate to drift away 
from its target. We will come back to this problem and analyse under what conditions the 
credibility of the inflation targeting regime can be enhanced.    
 
Figure 1. Output gap, inflation and stock prices 
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3.  ‘Leaning against the wind’ in the stock markets 
In this section we analyse the issue of the effectiveness of a ‘leaning against the wind’ strategy 
used by the central bank to limit the fluctuations in the stock prices. We will ask the question of 
whether this strategy improves the central bank’s capacity of stabilising output and inflation. 
Thus, we take the view that attempts to reduce stock price fluctuations should be gauged by the 
success they have in reducing inflation and output volatility.  
The way we attempt to answer this question is as follows. We simulated the model under 
different assumptions about the intensity of the ‘leaning against the wind’ strategy in the stock 
market as measured by the coefficient c4 in the Taylor rule equation. We selected values of c4 
ranging from 0 to 0.12. For each of these parameter values we simulated the model over 1000 
periods and computed the standard deviations of output, inflation and stock prices. We repeated 
this exercise 100 times and computed the mean standard deviations obtained for each value of 
c4. We show the results in Figure 2. We observe the following. As c4 increases the standard 
deviations of output, inflation and stock prices decline. At some point, i.e. when c4 comes close 
to 0.1 the standard deviations of output and inflation increase dramatically, while the standard 
deviation of the stock prices declines significantly. Thus, as long as the ‘leaning against the 
wind’ strategy is moderate, this strategy pays of and reduces the volatility of inflation, output 
and stock prices. When this strategy becomes too active (too large a value of c4), it creates 
additional volatility in inflation and output. We conclude that mild forms of interventions in the 
stock markets can be effective in reducing macroeconomic volatility.  STOCK PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY | 11 
 
 
Figure 2. Macroeconomic volatility and ‘leaning against the wind’ 
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4.  Inflation targeting and macroeconomic stability 
Our previous analysis was conducted in an environment of inflation targeting in which, 
however, agents maintained their scepticism about the credibility of the inflation targeting 
regime. As a result, as we have seen, the inflation rate occasionally departs from its target in a 
substantial way. Thus we modelled a regime of imperfect credibility of the inflation target.  
In this section we analyze two extreme cases concerning the credibility of the inflation target. 
One is to assume that it is 100% credibility; the other assumption is that there is no credibility at 
all. We take these two extremes, not because these are particularly realistic, but rather to focus 
on how different degrees of credibility affect macroeconomic stability and the capacity of the 
monetary authorities to enhance stability by leaning against the wind strategies in the stock 
markets.  
The way we model these two extremes is as follows. In the perfect credibility regime we assume 
that all agents perceive the central bank’s announced inflation target 
*
t π  to be fully credible. 
They use this value as their forecast of future inflation, i.e. 
*
1
~
t t t E π π = + . Since all agents 
believe this, they do not switch to the alternative forecasting rule of extrapolating the past 
inflation rate.  12 | PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
The other extreme case, i.e. zero credibility of the inflation target, is modelled symmetrically. 
Now no agent attaches any credibility to the announced inflation target, and therefore each of 
them is an ‘extrapolator’. As before, this is defined by 1 − = t
ext
t E π . In this case there is also no 
switching to the alternative forecasting rule.  
We show the results of these two exercises in figures 3 and 4. Let us concentrate on Figure 3 
first, showing the degree of macroeconomic volatility in a regime of 100% credibility of the 
inflation target. A first thing to note is that in a regime of full credibility of the inflation target 
the volatility of the output, inflation and stock prices is significantly lower as compared to the 
regime of imperfectly credible inflation target. The difference is quite high. Comparing Figure 3 
with Figure 2 shows that in a fully credible inflation targeting regime the standard deviation of 
output, inflation and stock prices are about half as large as in the case of imperfect credibility. 
Thus, credibility is extremely valuable. It allows reducing the volatility of all three 
macroeconomic variables, at no apparent cost.  
A second conclusion from a comparison of Figures 3 and 2 is that mild forms of ‘leaning 
against the wind’ in the stock market have a much stronger effect in reducing volatility of 
output, inflation and stock prices. Thus, credibility of the inflation target makes ‘leaning against 
the wind’ in the stock markets more effective in reducing macroeconomic volatility. (Note again 
that this only holds for relatively low levels of c4) 
The importance of credibility as a means to achieving macroeconomic stability and as a way to 
make ‘leaning against the wind’ in the stock market an effective stabilisation tool is reinforced 
by the results of Figure 4. These show that when there is total absence of credibility in the 
inflation target, the volatility of output, inflation and stock prices is higher for all values of c4. In 
addition, ‘leaning against the wind’ in the stock market, now has almost no stabilising 
properties for output and inflation (compare Figure 4 with Figure 2).    
Figure 3. Macroeconomic volatility when inflation target is 100% credible 
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Figure 4. Macroeconomic volatility when inflation target is 0% credible 
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5.  The trade-off between output and inflation variability 
Another way to evaluate ‘leaning against the wind’ strategies in the stock markets is to analyze 
how they affect the trade-off between output and inflation variability. We will proceed as 
follows. We return to the regime of imperfectly credible inflation target. We assume several 
values of c4 from 0 to 0.05 (the ‘leaning against the wind’ parameter in the stock market). We 
then compute the tradeoffs between output and inflation variability in the usual way.
8 We plot 
the results in Figure 5.   
A first important finding concerns the shape of these trade-offs. We find that these trade-offs are 
non-linear, i.e. there is a positively and a negatively sloped segment. The interpretation is the 
following. When the central bank does not care about output stabilisation (c2=0) we are located 
in the upper right points of the tradeoffs. An increase in the willingness to stabilise output (c2 
increases) leads to a downward movement along the trade-off. This means that when the central 
bank increases its output stabilisation effort it reduces both the variability of output and 
                                                      
8 That is, we allow the output stabilisation parameter (c2) in the Taylor rule to increase from 0 to 1 and 
compute the standard deviations of output and inflation for each value of c2. Note that the output 
stabilisation coefficient has much larger values than the stock price coefficient (c4). This has to do with 
the fact that the variations in stock prices per unit of time are a multiple of the variations in the output 
gap.  14 | PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
inflation. At some point, however, applying more stabilisation (c2 increases further) brings us in 
the upward sloping part. From then on more stabilisation leads to the traditional trade-off: more 
output stability is bought by more inflation variability. This is the standard result obtained in 
rational expectations models. In these models any attempt to stabilise output leads to more 
inflation variability. In our behavioural model this is not necessarily the case. Mild forms of 
output stabilisation (low c2) have the effect of reducing both output and inflation variability. 
When however the ambition to stabilise output is too strong, we return to the traditional 
negatively sloped trade-off and the gain in output stabilisation leads to more inflation 
variability. Thus, in our model some output stabilisation is always better than no stabilisation at 
all. This result comes from the structure of our model. When the central bank applies modest 
output stabilisation it also reduces the waves of optimism and pessimism. The latter affect not 
only output variability but also inflation variability. Thus by reducing these ‘animal spirits’ the 
central bank achieves both lower output and inflation variability. It can do this because it profits 
from a credibility bonus. Too much activism, however, destroys this credibility bonus, leading 
to the normal negatively sloped tradeoffs.   
A second finding from Figure 5 relates to the effect of ‘leaning against the wind’ in the stock 
market. We find that a more intense ‘leaning against the wind’ in the stock market improves the 
tradeoffs, i.e. shifts them downwards. Thus ‘leaning against the wind’ reduces both output and 
inflation variability. Note, however, that this result only holds in the positively sloped segment 
of the tradeoffs. In the negatively sloped part, there is no clear effect of leaning against the wind 
strategies. This suggests that ‘leaning against the wind’ strategies are effective in reducing both 
output and inflation variability for the same reason as output stabilisation does. These strategies 
tend to reduce the scope for waves of optimism and pessimism and thus stabilise the 
macroeconomy as a whole. A too aggressive use of these strategies, however, will tend to create 
an inflationary bias, which then re-establishes the negative trade-off between output and 
inflation variability.   
As in the previous section we analyzed the importance of the credibility of inflation. We do this 
by assuming the same two extreme regimes, perfect credibility and zero credibility. The perfect 
credibility case is shown in Figure 6. It confirms some of the results obtained earlier. For 
example, the tradeoffs under perfect credibility are located much lower than those obtained 
under imperfect credibility (compare Figure 5 with Figure 4). Thus, credibility dramatically 
improves the tradeoffs, leading to less variability of both output and inflation. We also find that 
‘leaning against the wind’ strategies improves these tradeoffs significantly, thus lowering both 
output and inflation variability.   
The case of zero credibility of inflation target is shown in Figure 7. The contrast with the 
previous figures is striking. The tradeoffs are located higher than in the previous two cases, and 
the positive segments of the tradeoffs have practically disappeared.  This has to do with the fact 
that the absence of any credibility in the inflation target is quickly punished by agents who will 
extrapolate the higher inflation that results from active stabilisation policies. We also conclude 
from Figure 7 that ‘leaning against the wind’ strategies have no visible impact on the tradeoffs. 
Thus policies aiming at reducing the volatility of asset prices by manipulating the interest rates 
do not improve macroeconomic stability when inflation targeting has no credibility.  
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Figure 5. Trade-off output and inflation variability: Imperfect credibility  
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Figure 6. Trade-off output and inflation variability: perfect credibility 
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Figure 7. Trade-off output and  inflation variability: zero credibility 
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6. Conclusion 
Should central banks use their interest rate instrument to influence the asset prices and to 
prevent bubbles from emerging? This question has been hotly debated by economists. It has 
become topical again since the credit crisis erupted in August 2007. We analysed this question 
using a behavioural macroeconomic model. This model produces booms and busts that arise 
from the fact that beliefs about the future become correlated. It is the appropriate one to study 
this question. 
Our main results are the following. Yes, central banks can influence stock prices, and by 
following ‘leaning against the wind’ strategies in the stock market, they can improve the trade-
off between output and inflation, i.e. they can reduce the volatility of both output and inflation. 
This result, however, only holds in an environment of credible inflation targeting. If the 
inflation target has a high degree of credibility we find that these ‘leaning against the wind’ 
strategies significantly improve macroeconomic stability (output and inflation stability). 
However, these policies aiming at reducing the volatility of asset prices by manipulating the 
interest rates do not improve macroeconomic stability when inflation targeting has no 
credibility.  17 | 
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Appendix A 
Parameter values of the calibrated model 
 
 
pstar = 0;          % the central bank's inflation target 
a1 = 0.5;         %coefficient of expected output in output equation 
a2 = -0.2;       %a is the interest elasticity of output demand 
a3 = 0.05;       %a3 is the elasticity of demand with respect to share prices 
b1 = 0.5;        %b1 is coefficient of expected inflation in inflation equation 
b2 = 0.05;       %b2 is coefficient of output in inflation equation 
b3 = 0.02;        %b3 is the elasticity of supply with respect to share prices 
c1 = 1.5;       %c1 is coefficient of inflation in Taylor equation 
c2 = 0.5;       %c2 is coefficient of output in Taylor equation 
c3 = 0.5;       %interest smoothing parameter in Taylor equation 
c4 = 0.0;       %stock price smoothing parameter in Taylor equation 
β = 0.01;               %fixed divergence in beliefs 
gamma = 10000;      %switching parameter gamma in Brock Hommes 
sigma1 = 0.005;        %standard deviation shocks output 
sigma2 = 0.005;        %standard deviation shocks inflation 
sigma3 = 0.005;        %standard deviation shocks Taylor 
rho=0.5;             %rho measures the speed of declining weights omega in mean squares 
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